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Does Personalization Increase Turnout? 
 Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 European Parliament Elections  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The 2014 European Parliament elections were the first elections where the major political groups 
each nominated a lead candidate (Spitzenkandidat) for the Commission presidency in the hope that 
this would increase the visibility of the elections and mobilize more citizens to turn out. Using data 
from the 2014 European Elections Study, an EU-wide post-election survey, we analyse whether and 
how the presence of the lead candidates influenced the individual propensity to participate in these 
elections. Our findings show that the recognition of the candidates increased the propensity to turn 
out, even when controlling for a host of other individual-level factors explaining turnout and the 
context factors known to facilitate participation. Furthermore, the campaign efforts of the 
candidates increased turnout, and reinforced the effect of candidate recognition. 
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2  
Introduction 
 
Ahead of the 2014 elections, the European Parliament (EP) boldly announced that “This time it’s 
different.” At the heart of this claim was a constitutional innovation in the Lisbon Treaty’s article 
17, which stated that the results of the European Parliament elections should be taken into account 
when selecting the next Commission President. To reinforce this link, the member parties of the 
major political groups of the European Parliament decided to each rally behind a common lead 
candidate (or Spitzenkandidat in the commonly used German term). Hence, for the first time in the 
history of the European Parliament, the extra-parliamentary party organisation of five major 
political groups of the European Parliament offered voters a choice regarding the next President of 
the European Commission: Jean Claude Juncker (European People’s Party, EPP),  Martin Schulz 
(Party of European Socialists, PES), Guy Verhofstadt (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for 
Europe, ALDE), Ska Keller and José Bové (European Green Party), and Alexis Tsipras (Party of 
the European Left).1  The European Parliament’s hope was that this innovation would firstly 
mobilize voters to take a greater interest in European elections and secondly increase its own 
power vis-à-vis the Council. While the attempt of the Parliament to impose the lead candidate of 
the largest group as Commission President was met with some opposition, 2 the EP ultimately 
won the inter-institutional battle when Juncker became Commission President. However, this 
leaves the question of what impact, if any, the innovation of candidates competing for the 
Commission presidency had on the nature of the elections.  
One crucial concern about electoral democracy in the Union is the persistently low turnout 
in European Parliament elections with less than half the electorate turning out to vote since 1999. 
The potential to increase political participation was therefore also at the heart of the European 
Commission’s support for the Spitzenkandidaten innovation, as they hoped this could “contribute 
to raising the turnout for European elections by strengthening the link between the election of the 
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representatives of the citizens with the selection and election process of the head of the European 
executive” (European Commission 2013:6).  Critics of the European Parliament’s claim to 
provide a democratic mandate for the next Commission president, however, have argued that 
there was generally very little awareness of the lead candidates among voters, and that their 
impact on turnout and vote choices was thus most likely negligible (see e.g. Open Europe 2014). 
This study contributes to this politically salient debate by examining the extent to which 
Spitzenkandidaten mobilized voters to turn out in the elections.  
In what follows we analyse whether and how the lead candidates affected the voting 
behaviour of EU citizens in the 2014 European Parliament election.  Analysing the 2014 
European Election Study (EES) post-electoral survey (Schmitt et al. 2015), we find a mobilizing 
effect of candidate recognition and campaign activity of the three most visible candidates in the 
race (i.e. Juncker, Schulz and Verhofstadt) on turnout. We also demonstrate that candidate 
recognition reinforces the effect of campaign activities on the propensity to turn out.  This has 
implications for the study of electoral democracy in the European Union (EU) and our 
understanding of campaign effects more generally. 
 
The Emergence of a Parliamentary System in the EU 
There were high hopes in Brussels that a stronger link between vote choice in European 
Parliament elections and the election of the Commission President would bolster interest in 
European elections and thereby strengthen the legitimacy of the EU as a whole (European 
Commission 2013; European Parliament 2014). At the heart of the argument in favour of 
Spitzenkandidaten is the expectation that it strengthens executive accountability in the European 
Union. One of the central concerns about the so-called democratic deficit is that the EU has until 
recently lacked mechanisms for citizens to hold the EU executive to account, or “to throw the 
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rascals out” of executive office, through the process of competitive elections (Follesdal and Hix, 
2006; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). The EU is a trans-national system of multi-level governance  
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001, 2003) with many of the features of national democracies, such as direct 
elections to one of the main legislative chambers.  However, unlike in parliamentary systems of 
democracy, there is no clear link between the party choice in parliamentary elections and the 
executive (the European Commission), at least not until recently. Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, 
the Commission President was chosen unanimously by the national governments of the member 
states. The public therefore had no direct way of influencing the election of the EU’s executive or 
hold it to account for its actions. The fact that European elections did not lead to the formation of 
a “government” has long been regarded as a key reason for why citizens are much less likely to 
vote (see Franklin and Hobolt, 2011; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). 
The Parliament’s powers vis-à-vis the EU’s executive have been strengthened in 
successive treaty revisions:  the Maastricht Treaty (1993) introduced a new “investiture 
procedure” where the Council must consult the European Parliament on their nominee for the 
Commission president and Parliament’s approval was required before the Member States could 
appoint the President and Members of the Commission as a collegiate body. The Amsterdam 
Treaty (1999) took matters further by requiring Parliament’s specific approval for the appointment 
of the Commission President, prior to that of the other Commissioners. Parliament also 
introduced hearings of Commissioners-designate in 1994.  These reforms, however, did little to 
strengthen the link between voters and the EU executive, or mobilize citizen interest in EP 
elections  (e.g. Hix and Lord, 1997; Lodge, 1996). Due to their perceived insignificance, the 
elections continued to be “second-order national elections” (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), where a 
majority of voters stayed at home, and others cast a vote in protest against national government or 
with their hearts without any regard to government formation (e.g., Hix and Marsh, 2007; Marsh, 
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1998; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). 
These problems led scholars and politicians alike to suggest constitutional innovations 
that could remedy the perceived democratic deficit in the European Union. The idea of Euro-
parties nominating competing candidates was already discussed in the 1990s by scholars such as 
Simon Hix (see Hix, 1997, 1998). The core objective was to inject real political and personalized 
choice into the EP election campaigns by having competing candidates for Commission President, 
with alternative political agendas, nominated the by Euro-parties, and the candidate of the 
winning party group would in turn be nominated by the Council and elected by the European 
Parliament to become the President of the Commission. As Hix noted optimistically in 2008, such 
changes could lead to “public identification of the policy options on the EU table and the winners 
and losers in the EU. In short, there would be democratic politics in the EU for the first time” 
(Hix, 2008: 164). 
These discussions about how to strengthen electoral accountability, and enhance public 
interest in European Parliament elections also played a central role in the debates leading to the 
failed Constitutional Treaty process and, in turn, the Lisbon Treaty (2009). In the Lisbon Treaty 
the investiture procedure was revised to emphasize that the European Council should ‘take into 
account the elections’ before nominating and that the European Parliament subsequently ‘elects’ 
the Council nominee.3 The wording of the treaty is ambiguous when it comes to the powers of the 
European Parliament to impose its own candidate. But the European Parliament seized upon the 
treaty change by deciding that the European political groups would nominate lead candidates for 
the post of European Commission president. In a resolution agreed on 22 November 2012, the 
European Parliament presented its main argument:  
[The Parliament] urges the European political parties to nominate candidates for the 
Presidency of the Commission and expects those candidates to play a leading role in the 
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parliamentary electoral campaign, in particular by personally presenting their programme 
in all Member States of the Union; stresses the importance of reinforcing the political 
legitimacy of both Parliament and the Commission by connecting their respective 
elections more directly to the choice of the voters.4 
 
This message was reinforced by a resolution of the European Commission (2013).5  Both 
institutions thus echo the message found in the academic literature concerning the key objectives 
of the reformed process of nominating and electing the Commission president. The aim is to 
transform the nature of elections to the European Parliament by creating a genuine contest for the 
top executive job and a choice between alternative political platforms. The hope is that this 
would mobilize citizens to take part in the elections and, in turn, contribute to the EU’s legitimacy.  
In addition to these high democratic hopes, there may also be more prosaic inter-
institutional reasons for the Spitzenkandidaten. By introducing its own candidate with the 
democratic legitimacy conveyed by the vote of Europe’s citizenry, the European Parliament put 
significant pressure on national governments to nominate the elected candidate to accept 
informally, if not formally, the Parliament’s right to appoint the EU’s executive, as it eventually 
happened (Schimmelfennig, 2014). However, this paper focuses on the extent to which there is 
any evidence that the Spitzenkandidaten had the desired impact on the campaign and the vote, by 
raising the stakes of the vote, personalising the electoral campaign, and thus attracting more 
voters to the polls. 
 
Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 campaign 
While the Parliament’s slogan that “this time is different” held plenty of promise, there were 
significant challenges to overcome for the Spitzenkandidaten to have any real impact on the 
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campaign and the elections. The first of these challenges is the lack of an EU wide common 
public sphere with a common media, not to mention the lack of a common language in which 
alternative political visions could be more easily discussed. Recent studies have shown an 
increasing ‘parallelization’ of public spheres across Europe, where similar if not the same issues 
are being debated at the same time (see Koopmans and Statham, 2010; Kriesi and Grande, 2014). 
However, whether this allows for a Europe-wide public debate on the elections akin to what we 
know from federal systems is an open question. Second, while the candidates were officially 
nominated by Euro-parties, it is still national parties that dominate the election campaigns. The 
lead candidates’ impact on national campaigns was therefore crucially dependent on the extent to 
which national parties and media involved the Pan-European candidates in their national 
campaign. As predicted in the second-order elections framework (Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2010; 
Reif and Schmitt, 1980), such parties had strong incentives to fight on domestic issues (e.g. 
national opposition parties against the national government) and even to deliberately disassociate 
themselves from the Spitzenkandidaten (as happened in the UK). Finally, the procedures 
adopted by the two major groups to nominate their candidates resulted in the nomination of two 
Brussels insiders, Juncker (former Prime Minister of Luxembourg and head of the Euro-Zone) and 
Schulz (President of the European Parliament). It was argued that the two had been selected for 
their European credentials rather than for their broad electoral appeal.  
Despite these challenges, the lead candidates did make efforts to run a distinctly 
European campaign. The five candidates had a total budget of €4.5 million (Pop, 2014), with 
Schulz, Juncker and Verhofstadt commanding most of it (this can be compared to an estimated 
spending of $2.6 billion in the last US presidential elections). Among the more eye-catching 
initiatives were the nine televised debates between the Spitzenkandiaten that took place 
between 9 April and 20 May 2014. They were conducted in French, English and German, and 
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broadcast on the internet, on Euronews and on selected national channels. A post-election 
survey of citizens in 15 EU countries suggests that 15 per cent of European citizens have seen 
at least one of the TV debates (AECR 2014).6 Not surprisingly these debates generated the 
most interest in the “home countries” of the lead candidates: in Luxembourg (Juncker) and in 
Greece (Tsipras) where 36  and 26 per cent of respondents respectively reported to have 
watched one of the debates whereas only 6 per cent of Dutch and British citizens had seen any 
of the debates.  
In addition to these debates, the candidates also had a substantial presence on the 
ground. In the two months prior to election day Schulz had 38 visits in 20 countries, Juncker 
covered 17 countries and participated in 34 campaign visits (i.e. days spent in the country), 
while Verhofstadt had a more “modest” presence with only 29 visits in 12 countries. These 
numbers might underestimate the true effort of the candidates, as they do not take into 
account that they often visited several cities or attended several campaign events on the same 
day (see Appendix 2 for a description of the campaign events). Most of these visits were 
classic campaigning events such as meeting party activists and party supporters, participating 
at large campaign gatherings, or meeting national candidates or national leaders. 
In addition, candidates had a significant on-line presence. Schulz was the most active in 
the online environment with approximately 110k twitter followers and almost 250k mentions 
during the two months before the elections. Verhofstadt also had a non-trivial presence with 
26k followers and 105k mentions in the same period, whereas Juncker was the least active 
twitter user of the three.7 We now turn to the question of whether these campaign activities – 
off- and online – managed to mobilize voters to take part in the elections. 
 
Turnout in European Parliament elections  
9  
Union-wide participation in European Parliament elections started at a low level of 62 per cent in 
the first direct elections in 1979 and declined further to just 43 per cent over the subsequent 
elections.  However, it is worth noting that this decline in average levels of turnout in EP 
elections can be largely accounted for by the changing composition of the EU electorate due to 
the multiple EU enlargements to countries with lower turnout habits in general elections.8  
Nonetheless, these low levels of turnout have attracted a great deal of attention both among 
policy-makers and scholars. Much of the focus has been on whether low turnout is a reflection of 
critical or even hostile attitudes towards the European Union. Indeed, it is a popular view in the 
media that Euroscepticism is a major driving force behind European election abstention (see also 
Blondel et al., 1998; Evans and Ivaldi, 2011; Mattila, 2003; Steinbrecher and Rattinger, 2012). 
However, the tenor of the analyses of individual level participation seems to point in a different 
direction. 
 In line with the second-order elections model, the main factor explaining low turnout 
seems to be the fact that so little is at stake in these elections. Individual-level analyses of turnout 
in European Parliament elections have repeatedly identified the same factors that contribute to 
our understanding of participation in first-order elections: social and political integration (being 
married, union membership and church attendance), habituation, political involvement (interest in 
politics, partisanship) and resources (education) are relevant here. On the supply side, the 
availability of suitable choice options has also been shown to play a significant role (van der Eijk 
and Schmitt, 2009; Wessels and Franklin, 2009). This is not to say that Euroscepticism has no 
influence on turnout, but that the evidence suggests that the main determinants of electoral 
participation in European election are the conventional ones drivers of abstention rather than 
citizens’ attitudes about the EU. Building on this, we explore how Spitzenkandidaten, through 
their mobilizing efforts, can contribute to raising individuals’ propensity to turnout. 
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We focus on two distinct mechanisms through which Spitzenkandidaten can increase voter 
mobilization. The first is personalization. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) were among the first to 
put forward this argument.  By looking beyond the classical explanations focusing on resources 
and attitudes, they emphasized the importance of the strategic effort of political leaders and the 
competition between them for mobilizing the electorate. This is even more important in the 
context of low levels of participation, such as European Parliament. In this context, party leaders 
(e.g. Spitzenkandidaten) play a more important role in mobilizing voters as they offer citizens the 
possibility to identify with individuals who personify their political goals and objectives 
(McAllister, 2007; Milner and Ladner, 2006). Therefore, no matter whether citizens like them or 
not, the mere presence of identifiable leaders should increase the probability of voting  
(McAllister, 2007)9.  The arrival of competing pan-European personalities in EP election 
campaigns is expected to have exactly the same effect, namely that it offered the European 
citizenry the possibility to associate EP party groups with identifiable leaders and thus increase 
turnout. The low level of competitiveness was previously seen as a major cause for non-voting in 
EP elections (van der Eijk and Schmitt, 2009). We thus expect that those individuals who are 
aware of the lead candidates and their role during the campaign would be more likely to turn out, 
as the presence of Pan-European candidates could increase the interest in and potentially highlight 
the significance of the European elections. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
  
H1: Individuals who are able to recognize one or more of the lead candidates for the position of 
president of the European Commission are more likely to turn out to vote in European Parliament 
elections. 
The second mechanism refers to the campaign activities of the lead candidates. Previous 
research emphasizes that parties and candidates play a substantial role in mobilizing the electorate 
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during the electoral campaign (Gerber and Green, 2000; Jackson, 1996; Karp et al., 2008; 
Leighley, 1995). Although this is usually measured at the individual level, by assessing the impact 
of canvasing and contacts on the propensity to cast a vote, it clearly shows the important 
mobilizing effect of party and candidate mobilization on voter turnout across contexts (Gerber and 
Green, 2000; Karp et al., 2008). All in all, an active campaign is expected to engage, inform and 
motivate voters leading to a higher turnout (Hillygus, 2005; Holbrook and Mcclurg, 2005; Jackson, 
1997). Starting from similar premises, Jones (1998) does indeed show that in the context of the US 
elections turnout was higher in the counties which were visited by the presidential candidates. 
Given the campaign effort of the Spitzenkandidaten described in a previous section, we can expect 
that their campaign activities had a similar mobilizing effect.  We therefore formulate our second 
hypothesis: 
 
H2: In political systems where the Spitzenkandidaten actively campaigned, individuals are likely 
more to turn out if they recognize them.  
 
This is not to say that the effects of personalization, operationalized here as candidate recognition, 
and campaign activities are unrelated. We argue that candidate reinforces reinforce the effect of 
campaign activities on turnout. The relationship could also be one where higher recognition rates 
are at least in part an outcome of the candidates’ campaign activities, since campaign activities 
increase the political information available to voters about individual candidates  (Jacobson, 1992; 
Shineman, 2012). However, we believe that in the case of the Spitzenkandidaten, this is less likely 
for a number reasons. The top three contenders were not complete unknowns before the 
campaign.10  Moreover, given that citizens have a higher propensity to pay attention to the 
campaign of the candidates they favour (Vavreck et al., 2002), we can also expect that they pay 
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more attention to the campaign activities of candidates who they already know. Thus, we anticipate 
that recognition facilitates the effect of the candidates’ campaign activities. Previous research has 
also shown that campaign activities (like visits and TV appearances) have a greater effect on 
citizens that have at least some basic previous knowledge of the candidates that campaign (Joslyn 
and Ceccoli, 1996; King and Morehouse, 2004; Vavreck et al., 2002). Based on all of this, we 
formulate our final hypothesis: 
 
H3: In political systems where the Spitzenkandidaten actively campaigned, individuals are more to 
turn out if they recognize them.  
 
Data and methods 
To test these hypotheses, the paper presents the first analysis of the European Election Study 
(EES) 2014 Voter Study (Schmitt et al. 2015).11 Following in the tradition of previous European 
Election Studies, this is a nationally representative post-election survey that was conducted in 
each of the 28 member countries of the EU. Approximately 1,100 respondents were interviewed 
in each EU member country, which adds to a total sample size of 30,064. The study was 
commissioned in collaboration with the Public Opinion Monitoring Unit of the European 
Parliament and was carried out by TNS Opinion in collaboration with its local partners between 
30 May and 27 June 2014. All the interviews were carried out face to face (by way of Computer 
Assisted Personal Interviews, or CAPI)12.  
The dependent variable of this paper is turnout. It is measured by a standard self-reported 
turnout question that also includes a memory cue (the date of the elections) and a “face saving” 
statement (“For one reason or another, some people in [OUR COUNTRY] did not vote in these 
elections”).  
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Our key explanatory variables capture individual-level awareness of the 
Spitzenkandidaten as well as cross-national variation in exposure to their campaign activity.  The 
difficulties in pinpointing campaign effects empirically are well-known, not least when using 
observational cross-sectional data, such as the EES.  A key concern is that it is hard to distinguish 
between campaign effects that are the result of actual mobilization that occurred during the 
campaign  and those that are due to pre-existing differences between people who are more 
exposed to the campaign (e.g. the more politically interested) and those who are not (e.g. the less 
politically interested).  To be more specific: those who recognized the Spitzenkandidaten  and 
those who didn’t may also differ on a number of other dimensions related to their likelihood to 
turn out, leading to a possible over-estimation of the recognition effect (Levendusky, 2011: 45). 
One solution would be to rely on experimental research – either embedded in the survey, in the 
laboratory or in the field - which avoids many of these inferential problems. In this study, 
however, where we are interested in the effects of a particular constitutional innovation in the EU 
and how its implementation has varied across member states, experiments are not ideal. Relying 
on cross-national survey data has the advantage of greater external validity compared to the 
artificial setting of a laboratory experiment, and the much more limited geographical scope of 
most field experiments.  While causality can never be established with complete certainty using 
an observational design, we do take several steps to reduce causal inference problems in our 
study. 
 First, we operationalize awareness of Spitzenkandidaten using a factual knowledge 
question, rather than a subjective assessment of knowledge, since that is more likely to capture 
people who have actually been exposed to information about the candidates.  We use a “name-
party” recognition battery that requires respondents to identify which EP party group or which 
national party supports the nomination of each of the three most important candidates:  Jean-
14  
Claude Juncker, Martin Schulz and Guy Verhofstadt. This requires voters to be familiar with 
both the candidates and to be able to associate them with a specific party. The respondents were 
offered four response options,13 so that a random guess was less likely to produce a correct 
answer. Second, we minimize the “omitted variables bias” by controlling for all the key factors, 
such as campaign engagement, education, political interest, partisanship and political efficacy, 
which are likely to be associated with both turnout and awareness of the Spitzenkandidaten.  
These control variables are discussed in more detail below. Third, in addition to measuring the 
mobilizing effect of the candidates at the individual level, we also capture their campaign activities 
as a context-level predictor (H2), and importantly we examine whether recognition can moderate 
the effect of the campaign context (H3).  
As a proxy for campaign activity we measure the number of campaign visits of each 
candidate per member country.  Taking into consideration both the limited campaign budgets of 
the candidates and their considerable activity on the ground, these visits seem to be the most 
important campaigning tool of the Spitzenkandidaten. Moreover, campaign visits in a specific 
country were likely to be covered in the national press which in turn would result in a greater 
exposure to the lead candidates’ messages.14 To test H3, we include an interaction term between 
campaign visits and individual candidate recognition. This allows us to examine whether 
individual-level candidate awareness reinforces the effect of the campaigning context on turnout. 
As mentioned above, we also include a host of control variables that are customarily used 
to explain the propensity of turnout in order to isolate the mobilizing effect of the 
Spitzenkandidaten. The first group of controls seek to capture campaign engagement (i.e. exposure 
to the campaign, campaign involvement and contact by a party) and general political engagement 
(interest in politics, level of political discussion, internal political efficacy, partisanship, and news 
consumption). These variables are generally considered as proxies for political mobilization 
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(Gerber and Green, 2000; Verba et al., 1995; Zuckerman et al., 2007) and individual resources 
(Burns et al., 2001; Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1995), both of which are known to be 
strong predictors of turnout.  Including these indicators thus allows us to control for possible 
confounding factors that determine both candidate recognition and the propensity to vote. 
Endogeneity problems can never be entirely ruled out in observational studies,  since the decision 
to turn out in the election may lead people to seek out the relevant information that would help 
them make the best choice (Downs, 1957; Lassen, 2005), which could, in turn, increase candidate 
recognition (i.e. reverse causality). However, by controlling for the level of political engagement 
of respondents, we reduce the possibility that the relation between recognition and propensity to 
participate is a result of previous knowledge or of information acquired during the electoral 
campaign. Thus, we can argue with greater certainty that any effect of candidate recognition on 
the turnout is a result of the “mobilizing effect” of the Spitzenkandidaten. 
We also control for social background variables that are indicative for social integration 
and individual resources. Historically these were among primary variables used to explain 
individual turnout (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba et al., 1995). They include union 
membership, church attendance, rural vs. urban residence, but also age, education, gender, 
marital status, employment status, immigrant status, and internet use. Finally, we also include 
attitudes towards political institutions that have been shown to be associated with turnout: trust in 
national parliaments, trust in EU institutions and attitudes towards EU membership. At the macro 
level, we control for compulsory voting, whether other elections took place at the same time as 
the EP elections, number of MEPs (as a proxy for population size) and turnout in the last 
legislative election before the EP elections15, as these are all factors that were shown in previous 
studies to have a strong influence on turnout in EP elections (e.g. Franklin and Hobolt, 2011; 
Wessels and Franklin, 2009). Furthermore, given the specificity of these elections, we also control 
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for a possible “home country” effect by using a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the three 
countries of the candidates (Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium) and zero otherwise.16 All 
independent variables were rescaled to have values between a theoretical minimum of 0 and a 
theoretical maximum of 1, thus allowing for a direct comparison of the strength of their effects 
(see Appendix 1 for a complete description of all variables). 
In order to test our hypotheses, we proceed in two steps. First we present country level 
descriptive data, which provide illustrative evidence of the aggregate relation between turnout and 
the mobilisation efforts of the candidates. Second we estimate a series of multilevel logistic 
regression models to identify the mobilization effects of the Spitzenkandidaten on the propensity 
to vote in the 2014 EP elections.17 Our unit of analysis at the higher level is party systems rather 
than countries.18 We use random intercepts and random slopes for the variables measuring 
candidate recognition and grand mean centring for aggregate level variables (Enders and Tofighi, 
2007).  
 
Empirical Analysis 
We start with some descriptive statistics showing turnout levels in the 2014 EP elections and the 
country-specific campaign of the Spitzenkandidaten (recognition and campaign activity). 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
Although the motto for the current European elections was “This time it’s different”, at a 
first glance this was not reflected in the 42.61% overall turnout level, which is still very low 
when compared to the turnout registered in first-order national elections. Nonetheless, when we 
exclude turnout in Croatia – the Union’s most recent member that did not participate in the 2009 
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election -  turnout across the EU was slightly higher than in 2009 at 43.78%. Furthermore, in ten 
of the 28 countries, we notice an increase in turnout. 
Turning to the campaign effects of the lead candidates, our data shows that the proportion 
of citizens who recognized the candidates (i.e. was able to link them to the correct party) is far 
from impressive. Only 19 per cent of respondents recognized Juncker and 17 per cent of them 
recognized Schulz. These numbers are even lower for the candidate of the smallest of the three 
political groups that we consider (Guy Verhofstadt), who was only recognised by 9 per cent of all 
respondents. Of course there are significant country differences as the candidates were better 
known in their countries of origin and the neighbouring ones than elsewhere.  
To test whether individual candidate awareness and campaign activity had an effect on 
turnout, we estimated a series of multilevel models shown in Table 2. Model 1 serves mostly as a 
reference model because it includes all the relevant variables except for the recognition of 
candidates and the number of their visits. A quick inspection of this model shows that the 
coefficients generally support the extant literature. In addition we note that all subsequent models 
have a better fit than Model 1. 
[Table 2 around here]19 
 
Given the multicolliniarity between recognizing the candidates (the correlation between 
recognizing Schulz and recognizing Juncker is 0.61), we chose to investigate these effects 
separately for each candidate. First, we note that the effects of recognition reach statistical 
significance in the case of all the candidates . What is more, these effects are quite substantive. In 
the case of Schulz, recognizing him increases the likelihood of casting a vote by 37 per cent. All 
else being equal20, this corresponds to an increase of 7 percentage points (from 32to 39 per cent) 
in the predicted probability that respondents who recognized him cast a vote. The effects are 
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similar for those who recognized Juncker. The predicted probability that they cast a vote is 44 per 
cent compared to 38 per cent for those who did not recognize him. For Verhofstadt, the size of the 
effect is substantially smaller, recognizing increasing the likelihood of casting a vote by only 17% 
per cent, which corresponds to an increase in the probability to vote of only 4% percentage points 
(from 37 to 41 per cent).  . This is probably due to the fact that he was the least likely of the three 
to be nominated for the presidency; recognizing him therefore did very little to boost the interest in 
the EP elections and to mobilize citizens to go out and vote. 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
Overall, campaign personalization by the Spitzenkandidaten, measured as recognition, 
had a substantial effect on the individual’s propensity to turn out. Importantly, this effect remains 
when controlling for potentially confounding factors such as political engagement (both general 
and campaign specific). Since the effects of the variables capturing political engagement basically 
remain the same after including candidate recognition, it appears that the latter is not simply a facet 
of the former.21 This does not mean that we can fully correct for any bias resulting from the 
potentially endogenous relationship between recognition and turnout, but including the 
confounding factors certainly reduces the bias. Finally, given the rather small proportion of 
respondents who actually recognized the Spitzenkandidaten , we need to acknowledge that the 
impact of personalization on the overall level of turnout is bound to be rather small. 
We also examine the impact of campaign activities of the lead candidates, measured as 
visits in a country during the campaign. Our basic expectation is that campaign visits facilitated 
the interest in and awareness of the forthcoming European Parliament election and thus mobilized 
turnout.  When looking at the main effects of the campaign visits, we only record statistically 
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significant effects for Schulz (Model 3) and Verhofstadt (Model 4). In both cases the effects are 
substantial, but we need to note that effect of Schulz campaign visits is almost twice as strong in 
with comparison to the effect Verhofstadt campaigning visits.22 What is rather puzzling is the lack 
of effect of Juncker’s campaign activities, even though he campaign more than Verhofstadt. One 
possible explanation might lie in his campaigning style. Verhofstadt’s campaign involved more 
grassroots activities such as traditional campaign rallies and meetings with party activists and 
supporters. Juncker's campaign, by contrast, concentrated on meetings with top level politicians, 
organised press briefs, participation in gala dinners, and so on – all of which might have been 
conducive to securing a possible appointment to the presidency of the Commission after the 
election rather than mobilising electoral support in the first place (see Appendix 2 for the 
description of the campaign visits).  
[Figure 2 around here] 
 
It is also important to note that Models 2 to 5 have a better fit than Model 1 (as showed by 
the reduction in the AIC and -2 log likelihood). Moreover, we can clearly show that the effects of 
recognition (see Figure 1) and campaign visits (see Figure 2) are indeed quite substantive.23  
In addition to their direct effect on turnout, we expect these two facets of mobilization to be 
related. More specifically, we expect that the effect of campaigning will be stronger among those 
who recognize the candidates (H.3). The cumulative effect of recognition and campaign visits is 
presented in Models 5 to 5. We note that the interaction reaches statistical significance for Schulz 
(Model 6) and Verhofstadt (Model 7) but not for Juncker. These findings are confirmed by the 
joint significance of the interaction terms which is statistical significant for Schulz (F=5,05, df=1, 
significant at p<0.05) and Verhofstadt (F=6.60, df=1, significant at p<0.05) but not for Juncker 
(F=0.01, df=1, not statistically significant). The lack an interactive effect in the case of Juncker is 
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not surprising given that we did not find any effect of his campaign visits on turnout. Figures 3A, 
3B and 3C support our understanding of these interaction effects. 
 
[Figure 3A, 3B and 3C around here] 
 
When plotting the change in predicted probability to vote depending on the visits of the 
candidates (see figures 3.A, 3.B  and 3.C) both in the case of  Schulz (Figure 3A) and Verhofstadt 
(3B), we note that visiting a country during the campaign had a statistically significant  effect 
only for those who recognized them (i.e. only for those who recognized the candidates the 
difference between visited and not visited is statistically significant different than zero)24 In the 
case of Schulz, the campaign visits increased the probability to vote by around 15 percentage 
points for those who recognized him as the S&D nominee. The effect is somewhat weaker for 
Verhofstadt (Figure 3B); citizens residing in countries that he visited and are able to identify 
him as the ALDE nominee are about 10 percentage points more likely to vote compared to those 
who recognize him but live in a country he did not visit. Furthermore, campaign visits had no 
effect for those who did not recognize these lead candidates. For Juncker, we cannot detect any 
moderating effect of campaign intensity; unsurprisingly given that the differences between 
groups are only driven by his recognition and his campaign intensity does not have a statistically 
significant effect per se. All in all, we find strong evidence for the moderating effect of 
personalization on campaign effects (i.e. visits). As we anticipated, campaign efforts only have a 
mobilizing effect for those who have at least some information regarding the candidates. 
Furthermore, it is also noteworthy that the highest probability of casting a vote was recorded 
among respondents who were able to identify Schulz and/or Verhofstadt as the lead candidate of 
their respective European party and live in region which the candidates have visited.  
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Discussion 
 
The European Parliament election of 2014 will be remembered as a triumph for the Euro-
sceptical parties, such as the United Kingdom Independence Party and Front National in 
France. But there was another significant innovation introduced in the electoral process of that 
election which in the long run might prove to be more consequential. The members of the 
eighth directly elected European Parliament were chosen in an electoral campaign which was 
headed by pan-European Spitzenkandidaten from each of the five major political groups in the 
European Parliament, who campaigned as candidates for the Presidency of the European 
Commission. This “democratic innovation”, building on the Lisbon Treaty, was supported by 
both the European Parliament and the European Commission. For the first time in the history of 
direct elections to the European Parliament, voters would have a real choice that could  be 
consequential for the election of the head of the EU’s executive body. The question is whether 
this innovation mattered for participation in the election. The likelihood for this to happen was 
not high. A meagre campaign budget, a short campaign, the diversity among local member 
parties representing the EU-wide party federations on the ground, the obstacles introduced by 
the variety of different languages spoken in the member countries – all of these factors posed a 
challenge to the mobilizing efforts of  the Spitzenkandidaten.  
Nonetheless, our results suggest that they indeed did manage to make a difference. Based 
on the analysis of the representative post-election European Election Study, we find that 
individual candidate recognition did positively affect the likelihood of EU citizens to 
participate. Citizens who knew the lead candidates were also more likely to turn out. The 
campaign efforts of these candidates also had a significant effect on electoral participation, both 
directly and in the interaction with personalization: campaign visits of the Spitzenkandidaten 
helped to further increase the likelihood of turnout among citizens who recognized them.   
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To be sure, these are fairly minor effects. Only a minority of our respondents, and hence 
of the members of the EU electorate, were able to identify correctly which political party the 
lead candidates belong to. And of course, this varies starkly between member countries. As a 
result, the mobilizing effect of the Spitzenkandidaten was limited as well. We also need to 
acknowledge that due the cross-sectional nature of our data we cannot be sure that we were 
able to fully correct for the possible endogenous relationship between candidate recognition 
and the decision to vote. We do, however, take measures to minimize this potential problem by 
controlling for all of the key factors that are normally associated to turnout. Moreover, given 
that can find significant mobilizing effects in 2014, there are good reason to believe that this 
innovation of lead candidates might have an even greater effect next time around when voters 
will have an “incumbent” president to vote on. 
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Table 1: Election turnout and candidate recognition, country level descriptives. 
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
Turnout 
in the 
2014 EP 
elections 
 
Turnout 
in the 
2009 EP 
elections 
 
Differenc
e in 
turnout 
(EP2014- 
EP2009) 
Turnout in 
the 
previous 
legislative 
elections 
 
Candidate recognition ** 
 
Number of campaign 
visits (i.e. starting two 
months before the 
elections) 
 
Juncker 
 
Schulz 
Verhofs
tadt 
 
Juncker 
 
Schulz 
Verho 
fstadt 
Austria 45.39% 45.97 -0.58% 74.91% 43.90% 39.77% 15.80% 1 1 1 
Belgium 89.64% 90.39 -0.75% 89.45%     31.09% 25.55 69.46 4 2 8 
Bulgaria 35.84% 38.99 -3.15% 52.49% 13.45% 17.63% 4.63% 1 1 0 
Croatia 25.24% 20.84* 4.40% 54.17% 11.97% 10.58% 4.08% 0 1 1 
Cyprus 43.97% 59.4 -15.43% 78.7% 17.17% 12.08% 5.66% 2 0 0 
Czech Republic 18.2% 28.22 -10.02% 59.48% 4.5% 5.69% 3.40% 0 1 1 
Denmark 56.3% 59.54 -3.24% 87.74% 17.42% 11.34% 3.23% 0 1 0 
Estonia 36.52% 43.9 -7.38% 63.53% 4.32% 5.24% 2.12% 0 0 0 
Finland 39.1% 38.6 2.4% 67.37% 25.18% 17.24% 11.50% 1 1 0 
Flanders     34.40% 26.72% 77.28% 3 5 8 
France 42.43% 40.63 1.8% 57.23% 12.48% 16.67% 2.42% 3 5 4 
Germany 48.1% 43.27 4.83% 71.55% 63.65% 66.93% 8.01% 8 11 1 
Great Britain     8.4% 2.03% 1.2% 0 0 0 
Greece 59.97% 52.61 7.36% 62.47% 21.84% 18.25% 1.76% 2 0 2 
Hungary 28.97% 36.31 -7.34% 61.73% 9.15% 9.69% 6.16% 0 0 0 
Ireland 52.44% 58.64 -6.2% 70.05% 13.41% 5.00 % 13.15% 0 1 1 
Italy 57.22% 65.05 -7.83% 75.19% 13.20% 20.26% 8.71% 1 2 5 
Latvia 30.24% 53.7 -23.46% 59.49% 14.69% 4.17% 2.75% 2 0 0 
Lithuania 47.35% 20.98 26.55% 52.93% 5.47% 7.48% 4.11% 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 85.55% 90.76 -5.21% 91.15% 80.48% 45.91% 23.05% 1 1 0 
Malta 74.8% 78.79 -3.99% 92.95% 34.37% 49.82% 4.23% 1 1 0 
Netherlands 37.32% 36.75 0.57% 74.56% 23.44% 16.00 % 24.16% 1 0 1 
Northern Ireland     10.36% 9.17% 4.73% 0 1 0 
Poland 23.83% 24.53 -0.7% 48.92% 5.56% 6.79% 5.15% 1 1 1 
Portugal 33.67% 36.77 -3.1% 58.03% 12.58% 9.20% 4.94% 2 1 0 
Romania 32.44% 27.67 4.77% 41.76% 5.42% 11.64% 3.34% 0 1 1 
Slovakia 13.05% 19.64 -6.59% 59.11% 6.58% 6.48% 5.11% 1 0 0 
Slovenia 24.55% 28.37 -3.82% 65.6% 17.67% 15.84% 8.92% 0 1 1 
Spain 43.81% 44.87 -1.06% 68.94% 10.94% 10.32% 3.35% 1 3 1 
Sweden 51.07% 45.53 5.54% 84.63% 21.15% 11.54% 5.16% 0 1 1 
UK 35.6% 34.7 0.7% 65.1% 8.87% 3.73% 2.04% 0 0 0 
Wallonia     25.58% 23.97% 58.82% 5 3 7 
EU mean 42,61% 43.00% -0.46% 67.47% 18.91% 16.87% 8.78%    
EU mean 
(without Croatia) 
43.78% 43.00% 0.78%        
* turnout level in the 2013 EP elections, ** unweighted  
 Table 2: Effect of candidate recognition and campaigning on turnout25 
 
Model 1: Without  
the candidates  Model 2: Juncker Model 3 Schulz Model 4: Verhofstadt 
Mode  5: Juncker, 
visits interaction 
Model 6: Schulz 
visits interaction 
Model 7: Verhofstadt 
visits interaction 
 Fixed effects           
Intercept -4.403*** (0.171) -4.410*** (0.216) -4.684*** (0.222) -4.524*** (0.192) -4.415*** (0.224) -4.498*** (0.232) -4.363*** (0.198) 
candidate 
recognition 
  
0.248*** (0.058) 0.314*** (0.067) 0.177* (0.087) 0.255** (0.097) 0.084 (0.121) -0.063 (0.126) 
knowledge 0.508*** (0.067) 0.459*** (0.067) 0.453*** (0.067) 0.493*** (0.067) 0.459*** (0.067) 0.452*** (0.067) 0.493*** (0.067) 
interest  0.451*** (0.065) 0.425*** (0.065) 0.426*** (0.065) 0.448*** (0.065) 0.425*** (0.065) 0.425*** (0.065) 0.446*** (0.065) 
political efficacy 3.812*** (0.126) 3.815*** (0.126) 3.811*** (0.126) 3.802*** (0.126) 3.815*** (0.126) 3.815*** (0.126) 3.804*** (0.126) 
(0.035) partisanship 0.580*** (0.035) 0.572*** (0.035) 0.568*** (0.035) 0.573*** (0.035) 0.571*** (0.035) 0.567*** (0.035) 0.572*** 
campaign 
involvement 1.911*** (0.107) 1.889*** (0.107) 1.880*** (0.107) 1.904*** (0.107) 1.889*** (0.107) 1.879*** (0.107) 1.902*** (0.107) 
candidate 
campaign visits   0.177 (0.216) 0.520** (0.195) 0.305+ (0.180) 0.185 (0.237) 0.243 (0.221) 0.010 (0.204) 
rec candidate X  
visits   
      
-0.010 (0.116) 0.313* (0.140) 0.416* (0.162) 
Random effects 
  
         
(variance)        
Intercept 0.253 0.276 0.285 0.281 0.274 0.64 0.257 
candidate 
recognition   0.019 0.046 0.073 0.019 0.031 0.050 
Residual 
(median) 0.247 0.250 0.247 0.251 0.250 0.247 0.249 
N individual 24137 24137 24137 24137 24137 24137 24137 
N system 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Log Likelihood -11,673 -11,655 -11,641 -11,661 -11,655 -11,639 -11,657 
AIC 23,406 23,378 23,350 23,389 23,380 23,347 23,385 
logit coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis; +denote p<0.1   *denotes p<0.05 ; **denotes p<0.01; ***denotes p<0. 001 
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Figure 1: Unconditional effect of recognition (changes in predicted probabilities) 
 
 
Figure 2: Unconditional effect of campaigning (changes in predicted probabilities) 
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Figure 3.A: Moderating effect of recognition depending on campaign visits, Schulz (changes 
in predicted probabilities)  
 
Figure 3.B Moderating effect of recognition depending on campaign visits, Verhofstadt 
(changes in predicted probabilities)
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Figure 3C: Moderating effect of recognition depending on campaign visits, Juncker 
(changes in predicted probabilities) 
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Notes 
 
1 The two political groups that decided not to put forward candidates were the soft Eurosceptic 
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and the hard Eurosceptic Europe for Freedom and 
Democracy (EFD). 
2 The governments of the United Kingdom and Hungary most openly were opposed to this 
decision. 
3 “Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the 
appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to 
the European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission. This candidate shall be 
elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members. If he does not obtain 
the required majority, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall within one month 
propose a new candidate who shall be elected by the European Parliament following the same 
procedure”. (Article 17(7) TEU). 
4 European Parliament Resolution of 22 November 2012 on the elections to the European 
Parliament in 2014 (2012/2829(RSP)) 
5 Commission Recommendation of 12 March 2013 on enhancing the democratic and efficient 
conduct of the elections to the European Parliament (2013/142/EU) 
6 The survey was conducted by AMR GmbH Dusseldorf on behalf of the AECR. The poll was in 
the field on 25 and 26 of May on a sample base of 12,132 respondents across 15 EU countries 
(6,083 voters and 6,049 non-voters). 
7 The source of these number is the TNS leader watch available at, http://www.tnsglobal.com/what-
we-do/european-leader-watch 
8 Analyses have shown that there has been little or no decline in individual countries, beyond a 
one-time drop often seen following the founding election in each country, but EU enlargement has 
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brought into the Union countries with lower turnout (both at EP and national elections) and its 
changing composition has certainly yielded declining turnout over the EU as a whole (see Franklin 
2001; Trechsel, De Sio and Grazia 2014). 
9 We need to acknowledge that it might also be the case that Spitzenkandidaten do not mobilize 
voters, but citizens who are mobilized to vote by other facets of the campaign are more motivated to 
acquire information (Shineman, 2012) and hence also gain information about the existence of the 
Spitzenkandidaten. Nevertheless this seems less likely given that previous research clearly shows 
that the acquisition of information during electoral campaigns, in our case being aware of the 
existence of competing candidates for the presidency of the EC, increases the propensity to turnout 
(Larcinese, 2007; Lassen, 2005).   
10 As we have pointed out earlier, Schulz was the President of the European Parliament at the time 
of the election campaign, Juncker was the former Prime Minister of Luxembourg and head of the 
Euro Zone, and Verhofstadt was the Prime Minister of several previous Belgian governments. 
11 The EES part of the study was funded by a consortium of private foundations, led by the 
Volkswagen Foundation and supported in addition by the Mercator Foundation, the Swedish 
Rijksbank Foundation, and the Portuguese Gulbenkian Foundation. The study benefited in 
addition from the generous support of TNS Opinion.  
12 More details regarding the study can be found at http://eeshomepage.net/voter-study-2014/ ; 
questionnaires in both English and French are available at the following link: eeshomepage.net/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/Master-Questionnaire.pdf 
13 “Socialists & Democrat (S&D)” (identified e.g. in Germany by mentioning the SPD), 
“European People's Party (EPP)” (identified in Germany by the CDU/CSU), “Liberals and Allies 
Group (ALDE)” (identified in German by the FDP) and finally “The Greens” (identified in 
Germany by Die Grünen). In countries where two or more parties were expected to join an EP 
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group, the biggest party was mentioned. In countries where there was no party supporting one of 
the four EP groups, only the name of the EP group was provided. 
14 Given the distribution of the variable (see Appendix 1) and the limited campaign time, we chose 
to use a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the candidate visited a country and 0 otherwise. 
15 It is worth mentioning that post-communism, the level of GDP per capita, and turnout in the 
previous national elections are highly correlated. Controlling for any of the three yielded a very 
similar pattern of results (i.e. the significance levels for the effects of interest were the same).  
16  As the effect of campaign visits might be related to the population size (either because 
candidates might want to avoid small countries or because citizens in small countries consider 
themselves irrelevant for the outcome), we also control for the number of MEPs (as a measure of 
the population size) as an addition robustness check. This analysis is presented in Appendix 5 and 
the results are very similar to those presented in Table 2 (using the log of the population or the 
actual size of the population instead of the number of MEPs reveals a very similar pattern of 
results). Another option would be to weight the number of visits by the population size (i.e. 
number of MEPs), we present these results in Appendix 6. Still as population size was previously 
linked to turnout, we consider that mixing the two indicators in one variable is not the best 
solution. Another robustness check consists of including individual level turnout in the previous 
legislative elections in our models (see Appendix 7). Even if this is a stringent robustness test the 
results presented in Appendix 7 hold (i.e. they are very similar to the ones in Table 2). This 
indicates that even after taking into account whether respondents are habitual voters, our results 
hold.  
17 The analysis is conducted in R, using the lme4 package version 1.1-7. 
18 Both in Belgium and in the UK, there are effectively two party systems in operation: the 
Walloon and the Flemish in the Belgian case, and the British and Northern Irish in the UK case. 
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Furthermore in the case of the UK, Northern Ireland and Great Britain had very different electoral 
systems in place to select the EP candidates. However, using country as a nesting unit reveals a 
very similar pattern of results (see Appendix 8). 
19 In Table 2 we only present a short version of the full models. For the models with all the 
controls see Table 3 in Appendix 3 
20 All predicted probabilities were computed using simulations based on the normal distribution of 
coefficients, while keeping all continuous variables at their mean and all categorical variables at 
zero. 
21 Among other indicators our models take into account political knowledge and political interest 
that are the most likely “suspects”. 
22 Everything else being equal, the predicted probability to vote for respondents who live in a 
country in which Schulz campaigned is 44% compared to a baseline predicted probability of 32% 
for those who live in another country. In the case of Verhofstadt the effect is equally noteworthy, 
the predicted probability of a respondent living in a country that he campaigned is 44% compared 
to 37% for those living in other countries.  
23 What is still puzzling is that while the effect of campaign visits in Models 3 and 4 is statistically 
significant, it does not help to explain the random variance of the intercept. 
24 When plotting the predicted probabilities for each group (see Appendix 4 figure A3A, A3B and 
A3C) we can see that the confidence intervals in all three figures overlap. However, even if the 
confidence interval overlap, the mean difference between group can be statistically significant 
greater than zero, which shows a statistically significant difference (Afshartous and Preston, 2010). 
This is exactly the case in Figure 3A and Figure 3B. 
25 All models presented in Table  2 also include the following controls: marital status, education, 
age gender, employment status, rural, religiosity, union membership, level of political discussion, 
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news exposure, campaign exposure,  contact by politician, trust in national parliament, trust in EU 
institutions,evaluation of EU membership, compulsory voting, concurrent  national election, 
turnout in national election, candidate nationality and number of MEP (see Appendix 3 for full 
models). 
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